Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 1

Article 16

Winter 1-1-1982

First National Maintenance Corp. V. Nlrb: The Supreme Court
Narrows Employers' Section 8(A)(5) Duty To Bargain

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
First National Maintenance Corp. V. Nlrb: The Supreme Court Narrows Employers' Section
8(A)(5) Duty To Bargain, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 285 (1982).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol39/iss1/16
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington
and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee
Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE CORP. V. NLRB:
THE SUPREME COURT NARROWS EMPLOYERS'
SECTION 8(a)(5) DUTY TO BARGAIN
The aim of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended,1 is
to promote industrial peace by encouraging labor and management to
resolve disputes through the process of collective bargaining.2 Congress
intended the bargaining requirements of the NLRA to allow meaningful
discussion of issues vital to both labor and management by providing
labor and management with comparable bargaining strength,3 Section,
8(a)(5) of the NLRA' requires employers to bargin in good faith over decisions concerning matters set out in section 8(d) of the NLRA.5 The man1

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1976). See generally Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to

Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1941) (discussion of historical

background of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)).
2 Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937); Declaration of Policy, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976);
Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 HARv. L. REV. 1071, 1091 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Magruder]. Section 8(d) of the
NLRA defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith .. ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Under § 8(d), therefore, collective bargaining occurs
when an employer bargains with all of its employees by bargaining with the representative
of the employees. See Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401,
1402-03 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Cox]. Congress enacted the NLRA's collective bargaining provisions in order to allow employee participation in decisions affecting the employment relationship. Cox, supra, at 1407. Employee participation through bargaining is
necessary to give value to the right of employees to organize. Magruder, sup:a, at 1102.
Once the duty to bargain collectively has attached under NLRA § 8(a)(5), an employer cannot bargain with employees individually. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335-39 (1944);
see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
3 Declaration of Policy, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). In furtherance of bargaining parity, the
NLRA places reciprocal restrictions and obligations upon both labor and management. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1-(a)(5) (1976) (placing bargaining duties on employers) with 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1)-(b)(7) (1976) (placing bargaining duties on unions).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Sectioi 8(a)(5) provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section [9(a)] ...
5 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Section 8(d) provides:
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunderand the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession ...

(emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has defined good faith in bargaining as requiring serious intent to reach
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datory subjects of bargaining under section 8(d) are "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment."' The broad language of section 8(d), however, does not clearly define the business decisions over
which management mut bargain as mandatory collective bargaining
subjects.7 In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB (FNM),8 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of
the NLRA require management to bargain collectively with the union
over the employer's decision to terminate a portion of its business.9
In FNM, First National Maintenance Corporation (FNM) provided
cleaning, and maintenance services for commercial customers in return
for a set fee plus reimbursement of labor costs:"° In early 1977, approximately thirty-five FNM employees were performing cleaning services
at the Greenpark Care Center nursing home (Greenpark).11 In March
1977, FNM's Greenpark employees selected as their bargaining agent
a common ground. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960); see
NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 139 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887
(1953) (good faith requires employer to make reasonable effort to resolve differences with
union). See generally Cox, supra note 2.
I NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S., 342, 349 (1958); 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1976); see note 5 supra.
Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1978). The courts and
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) have determined that mandatory subjects
of bargaining under § 8(d) of the NLRA include employee benefits. See, e.g., American
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 552, 554-55 (9th Cir.),. cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935
(1969) (housing); Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
904 (1969) (profit sharing plans), Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 717, 724 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956) (stock purchase plans); W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174
F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949) (insurance plans); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251
(7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (pensions); NLRB v. J.H. Allison & Co., 165
F.2d 766, 768-69 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948) (merit wage increases); Singer
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131, 136-37 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941) (bonuses);
Weyerhauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672, 673-77, 25 L.R.R.M. 1163, 1167 (1949) (meals).
The courts and the Board further have determined that matters relating to employee
security are mandatory bargaining subjects. See, e.g.; Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964) (contracting out); NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Asso'd Gen.
Contractors of Am., Inc., 349 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1965) (hiring practices); Industrial Union
of Marine & Shipbuilding Wkrs. v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 984 (1964) (seniority program operation); NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d
84, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1953) (promotion procedures); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247,
251-52 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (compulsory retirement policies);
Rapid Roller Co. v. NLRB, 126 F.2d 452, 459-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 650 (1942)
(employee transfer procedures); NLRB v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 120 F.2d 1004, 1006
(3d Cir. 1941) (layoff selection methods); Perry Rubber Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 225, 228, 48
L.R.R.M. 1630, 1631-32 (1961) (job bidding procedures).
8 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981).
9Id.
10101 S. Ct. at 2575. FNM's labor costs at Greenpark included gross salaries, Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) taxes,
and insurance. Id. Under the terms of the original contract of April 28, 1976, the supervisory fee was $500 per week. Id. The weekly fee had been reduced to $250 by mid-1977. Id.
i Id.

19821
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the Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, Retail, Wholesale and
2
Department Store Union, AFL-CIO (the Union). The National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) certified the election of the Union as the
bargaining agent for FNM's Greenpark employees in May 1977."
14
Prior to engaging in collective bargaining with the Union, FNM.
asked Greenpark for a fee increase because the operation had become
unprofitable. 5 Greenpark, however, rejected FNM's fee increase request. 6 In response to the rejection, FNM informed Greenpark on July
25 that FNM would cease operation at Greenpark after July 31.1? On July
28, FNM notified its Greenpark employees that FNM had terminated the
contract with Greenpark and would discharge all Greenpark employees
on July 31.18 The Union's vice president immediately informed FNM of
9
the Union's desire to bargain with FNM over the decision to close.
FNM refused the Union's bargaining request, stating that the closing
decision was due solely to financial difficulties and that FNM would not
reverse the closing decision.20 FNM closed the Greenpark operation and
discharged the employees on July 31, 1977.21
' Id. at 2575-76. A majority of the Greenpark employees in FNM selected the Union of
Hospital and Health Care Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employees
(the Union) as their representative at a Board-conducted election. Id.; see J. FEERICK, H.
BAER & J. AFRA, NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS-LAW PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (1980)
(discussion of representation election procedures).
I
101 S. Ct. 2576, n.3. Under § 9 of the NLRA, the Board certifies the election of a,
union once a majority of voting employees in an appropriate bargaining unit has selected a
particular union as the employees' bargaining representative. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
Once the Board has certified the election of a union, that union becomes the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) (§ 9(a) of
NLRA).
" 101 S. Ct. 2576. The Union in FNM notified FNM in writing on July 12 that the
Board had certified the Union as the employees' bargaining agent and that the Union
wanted to exercise the right to bargain with FNM. Id. FNM did not respond. id.
11Id. at 2575. The employer in FNM asked Greenpark to reinstate the supervisory fee
to the originally contracted for rate of $500 per week. Id.; see note 10 supra.
"SSee 101 S. Ct. at 2575.
17Id.

" Id. at 2576. The FNM facts show that FNM did not give adequate notice to the
Union of the Greenpark closing decision. Id.; NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627
F.2d 596, 598 (2d Cir. 1980). The NLRA requires employers to give to representative unions
timely notice of decisions that result in employee discharge. Rabin, Limitations on
Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND. L. REV. 133, 150 (1974).
" 101 S. Ct. at 2576.
o Id. In FNM, the Union's vice president spoke with FNM's-secretary-treasurer, and
requested a delay in the closing for bargaining purposes. Id. FNM refused the delay request, stating that a notice provision in the Greenpark-FNM contract made prohibitively expensive any delay beyond August 1, 1977. Id. The Union's vice president unsuccessfully attempted to obtain Greenpark's waiver of the notice provision. Id.
21 Id. The facts in FNM indicate that FNM's hiring policy was to hire on a job-by-job
basis, and not to move employees from one operation to another. Id. at 2575. In addition, the
contract between FNM and Greenpark prohibited Greenpark from hiring FNM's employees
until 90 days after the termination of the contract. Id. Thus, the discharged employees were
ineligible for employment at either Greenpark or another FNM operation.
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The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Regional Office of the Board," alleging that FNM's refusal to bargain over the
Greenpark closing decision violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA." The Regional Director issued a complaint against FNM,2' and an
administrative law judge in a subsequent hearing found in favor of the
Union.' The administrative law judge reasoned that since an employee's
discharge is a change in his conditions of employment,2 8 the NLRA per se
required FNM to bargain collectively over the decision to close the
Greenpark operation." The Board adopted the administrative law
judge's findings of fact and per se rule,28 and ordered FNM to bargain
' Id at 2576. Unfair labor practices consist of violations of § 8 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1976). Under § 10 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976), Congress empowered the
Board to prevent unfair labor practices affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) (§ 10(a)
of NLRA). The Union in FNM filed the unfair labor practice charge under § 10(b) of the
NLRA. 101 S.Ct. at 2576; see 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976). Any person may file an unfair labor
practice charge. 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1980). The filing must occur within six months of the
alleged unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976) (§ 10(b) of NLRA). The person alleging
the unfair labor practice must file the charge with the Regional Director for the region in
which the unfair labor practice takes place. 29 C.F.R. § 102.10 (1980). A Regional Director is
the Board-designated agent for a particular region. 29 C.F.R. § 102.5 (1980).
' 101 S. Ct. at 2576. Section 8(a)(1) provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section [7]...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Actions that violate §§ 8(a)(2)-(a)(5) can derivatively violate
§ 8(a)(1). A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES ON LABOR LAW 114 (9th ed. 1981); see NLRB v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 526 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1975) (violation of § 8(a)(3) constitutes interference with § 7 rights and thus violates § 8(a)(1)); Allied Indus. Workers v. NLRB, 476
F.2d 868, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (employer's refusal to bargain violates both § 8(a)(5) and
§ 8(a)(1)); NLRB V. New England Tank Indus., Inc., 302 F.2d 273, 275, 277 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 875 (1962) (employer's refusal to hire because of union membership violates
§§ 8(a)(1) & (a)(3)); Art Metals Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1940) (violation
of § 8(a)(5) is violation of § 8(a)(1), since House and Senate Committee Reports declare that
§§ 8(a)(2Y-(g) were species of generic unfair labor practice of § 8(a)(1)). But see Overnite
Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 765, 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967) (violation
of § 8(a)(5) not necessarily § 8(a)(1) violation).
1 101 S. Ct. at 2576. Under § 10(b) of the NLRA, the Regional Director has authority to
issue complaints. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1981). For application of the
NLRA to maintenance firms, see D.A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1946) (commerce clause brings maintenance firms within coverage of Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976)).
101 S. Ct. at 2576; First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 464, 466 (1979). The
2
Board in FNM noted that the administrative law judge, without setting forth conclusions,
had made the necessary factual findings to conclude that § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(5) violations had
occurred, 242 N.L.R.B. at 462 n.1.
An administrative law judge is the agent of the Board who conducts the hearing in an
unfair labor practice proceeding. 29 C.F.R. § 102.6 (1981). The duties and powers of the administrative law judge are set out in 29 C.F.R. § 102.5 (1981).
2' 242 N.L.R.B. at 465; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) (§ 8(d) of NLRA); note 5 supra.
' 242 N.L.R.B. at 465.
2 Id. at 462. After a hearing upon an unfair labor practice complaint, the administrative law judge must prepare and file with the Board a written decision containing findings

1982]

FNM v. NLRB

with the Union and to reinstate the Greenpark operation employees
with backpay.2 The Board petitioned for enforcement of the order. 0
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Board's petition
for enforcement.' The appeals court, however, applied an analysis different from that of the Board.2 The Second Circuit rejected the Board's
per se rule and held that section 8(d) of the NLRA created only a presumption that all partial closings are mandatory subjects of bargaining.'
of fact, reasoning, conclusions, and recommendations for disposition of the case. 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.45 (1981). Unless the parties file timely exceptions under 29 C.F.R. § 102.46 (1981), the
administrative law judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendations automatically
become those of the Board. 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(a) (1981).
242 N.L.R.B. at 462-63. The Board in FNM ordered FNM to compensate the
discharged employees with backpay for the period beginning at the date of discharge and
ending when FNM and the employees bargained to agreement, or bargained to impasse, or
when the Union failed to timely request bargaining, or when the Union failed to bargain in
good faith. Id. at 462-63. The Board ordered FNM to determine the amount of backpay due
by applying'the formula set forth in F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289, 292-93, 26
L.R.R.M. 1185, 1185-86 (1950) (backpay amount to be computed, on quarter-by-quarter basis,
by subtracting net amount earned elsewhere from amount discharged employee would have
earned), and the amount of interest on the backpay by applying Florida Steel Corp., 231
N.L.R.B. 651 (1977) (interest on backpay accrues from last day of each calendar quarter of
backpay period, on total amount then due and showing, at then current adjusted prime interest rate). 242 N.L.R.B. at 462-63. The Board further ordered FNM, if FNM resumed
operations at Greenpark, to offer to reinstate the discharged employees to their former or
similar positions. Id. If FNM did not resume operations, the Board directed FNM to place
the discharged employees on a preferential hiring list for positions at other FNM locations
that were equivalent to their former positions. Id.
* See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976); NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596,
597 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).
3' NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 603 (2d Cir. 1980). Under
§ 10(e) of the NLRA, the Board has the power to petition for enforcement of an order any
Circuit Court of Appeals in any circuit where the alleged unfair labor practice occurred or
where the alleged violator resides or transacts business. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). The Board
may petition the apropriate federal court for enforcement if the alleged violator does not
comply with the Board's order, or if the Board chooses to implement the order with a court
decree. 29 C.F.R. § 101.14 (1981). The court then reviews the record and the NLRB's findings and order, and may enforce, modify, or set aside in whole or in part the Board's findings and order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976) (§ 10(e) of NLRA); 29 C.F.R. § 100.14 (1981). The
court alternatively may remand the case to the Board for further proceedings. 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.14 (1981).
627 F.2d at 598-603; 101 S. Ct. at 2577. The Supreme Court in FNM noted that the
Second Circuit erred in upholding the Board's order without remanding for further examination of the evidence since the Second Circuit used an analysis different from that of
the NLRB. 101 S. Ct. at 2577. n.6. The Court cited NLRB v. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507 (1977),
and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). In Pipefitters, the Court followed the
Chenery Corp. rule that a court cannot uphold an administrative order on grounds different
from those upon which the administrative agency acted in issuing the order. 429 U.S. at 522
n.9; 318 U.S. at 95. If the court must correct an error of law that the administrative agency
has made in issuing the order, the court must remand to the agency for further findings of
fact necessary for application of the law. 429 U.S. at 522 n.9; ICC v. Clyde S.S. Co., 181 U.S.
29, 32-33 (1901).
3 627 F.2d at 601-02. Like the Second Circuit in FNM, the Third Circuit in Brockway
Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 735 (3d Cir. 1978), rejected the per se approach. In

WASHING TON AND LEE LA W REVIE W

[Vol. XXXIX

Under the Second Circuit's presumption approach, an employer can
rebut the presumption that the NLRA requires bargaining over partial
closing decisions by showing that imposition of a duty to bargain would
not further the purposes of the NLRA.Y The Second Circuit stated that a
bargaining requirement would further the purposes of the NLRA if bargaining over the employer's decision could reasonably be expected to
modify or reverse the decision. 5 Finding that FNM had failed to rebut
the presumption that the decision to close the Greenpark operation was
Brockway, the employer, Brockway Motor Trucks (Brockway), decided to close one of its
plants for reasons that Brockway claimed were purely economic. Id. at 722. Brockway did
not notify or bargain with the employees' union concerning the decision to close. Id. Applying a per se rule that § 8(a)(5) requires employers to bargain over partial closing decisions,
the Board found that Brockway's refusal to bargain violated § 8(a)(5). Id. at 724. The Third
Circuit refused to adopt the Board's per se rule, and instead took a presumption approach.
Id. at 734-35. The Third Circuit's approach sets forth the presumption that § 8(a)(5) requires
employers to bargain over partial closing decisions, and establishes a balancing test of
employee interests against employer interests. Id. For thorough analyses of the Third Circuit's Brockway opinion, see 47 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 679 (1979); 92 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1979);
10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 737 (1979); 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 157 (1979).
The Second Circuit in FNM agreed with the Brockway court's presumption approach,
but did not adopt the Brockway court's focus on the respective interests of employers and
employees in bargaining as determinative of whether bargaining should take place. 627 F.2d
at 601; see text accompanying note 34 infra. In adopting the presumption, the Second Circuit reasoned that a partial closing decision affects terms and conditions of employment as
much as does a decision to contract out, which the Supreme Court has found to fall within
the literal meaning of § 8(d). 627 F.2d at 601; see Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S 203, 210 (1964); text accompanying notes 77-84 infra. The Second Circuit rejected
the Brockway balancing test that measured employer interests against employee interests
on the grounds that the aims of the statute are a more important consideration than the
relative injury to the parties. 627 F.2d at 601.
1 627 F.2d at 601. The Second Circuit in FNM suggested that an employer could rebut
the Second Circuit's FNM duty-to-bargain presumption by showing that bargaining would
be futile because bargaining over a decision that union concessions would not change could
not further the NLRA's purpose, that emergency financial circumstances necessitated the
closing decision, that absence of contractual obligations in most bargaining agreements indicates that the custom of the industry is not to bargain over such decisions, or that forced
bargaining would endanger the existence of the entire business, to the detriment of the remaining employees. Id. at 601-02.
1 Id. at 602. The Second Circuit in FNM found that FNM had asserted that it was losing money at Greenpark, but that FNM had failed to show that bargaining over the closing
would have been "futile and therefore nonobligatory." Id.; see note 34 supra. The court
should have remanded the cse to the Board for further findings of fact, however, because
the Second Circuit applied different reasoning to uphold the Board's order. See note 32
supra.Since the Second Circuit did not allow further Board fact finding, FNM did not have
an opportunity to show that bargaining would have been futile. Additionally, the Second
Circuit characterized the central issue in FNM as whether bargaining could reasonably be
expected to modify or reverse FNM's partial closing decision. 627 F.2d at 602. Despite
failure to remand for further fact finding, the Second Circuit found sufficient evidence in the
record to indicate that the Union possibly could have made wage or benefit concessions that
would have enabled FNM to operate profitably at Greenpark. Id. The Second Circuit noted
that neither party had claimed, and the court did not find, that the record was sufficient to
allow the court to resolve the FNM issue. Id. at 603 n.9.
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a mandatory subject 3of
bargaining, the Second Circuit granted the peti6
tion for enforcement.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in recognition- of the inconsistent results among and between the Courts of Appeals and the Board on
the question of whether a partial closing decision is a mandatory collective bargaining subject." Holding that the FNM employer's decision is
not a section 8(d) matter over which Congress required bargaining, the
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and remanded the case for
further consideration. 9 In reversing the Second Circuit, the FNM Court
rejected the Second Circuit's presumption approach and set forth a
balancing test for determining when a partial closing decision is a man0
datory collective bargaining subject."
The Court focused upon the
NLRA's purpose of promoting industrial peace through the process of.
collective bargaining between labor and management as bargaining
equals.4 1 Although acknowledging that a management decision which
results in employee discharge has a direct impact upon the employment
relationship, 2 the Court maintained that an employer must be sufficiently
free from bargaining constraints to make decisions essential to running
a profitable business. 3 According to the FNM Court's balancing test,
therefore, the NL;RA requires bargaining over a partial closing decision
Id. at 603.

First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981); 101 S. Ct. 2575, 2578
(1981); see note 33 supra.The judgment of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals is subject to
Supreme Court review under § 10(e) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976).
101 S. Ct. at 2584.
39Id. at 2585.
40 Id.
at 2581.
4 Id. at 2578; see text accompanying notes 1-3 supra. The FNM Court stated that the
purpose of characterizing a matter as a mandatory bargaining subject is to promote
bargaining equality between labor and management by ensuring labor-management discussion of issues of vital importance to both parties. 101 S. Ct. at 2580. The Court reasoned that
a requirement that management bargain with the union gives the union added strength to
bargain as an equal with management. Id. The Court maintained, however, that labeling a
matter as a mandatory subject would accomplish nothing unless the parties could resolve
the matter through the bargaining process. Id.
" 101 S. Ct. at 2579. The FNM Court enumerated three categories of management decisions that have an impact on the employment relationship. The Court mentioned decisions
having only an attenuated impact on the employment relationship, such as product promotion, design, and financing; decisions, such as work requirements, that have a direct impact
and focus on the employment relationship; and decisions that have a direct impact on the
employment relationship while focusing on a concern apart from the employment relationship. Id. The Court found that FNM's decision to close the Greenpark operation was a decision of the third type. Id.; see text accompanying notes 85-86 infra.
" 101 S. Ct. at 2580. The FNM Court noted that the NLRA's bargaining requirement
does not compel an employer to capitulate to union demands. Id. at 4772 n.17; see 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1976) (§ 8(d) of NLRA); note 5 supra (neither party compelled to agree to proposals
or to make concessions). The Court's sole example of constraints of bargaining was the
union's possible use of power to strike after the parties reach a bargaining impasse. 101
S. Ct. at 2580 n.17.
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only if the bargaining requirement furthers the aims of the NLRA more
than it restricts the employer's necessary freedom to run the business.4
In applying the balancing test, the. FNM Court considered the
respective interests of both management and labor in bargaining over
decision-making to determine whether requiring bargaining would advance the neutral purposes of the NLRA. 5 In weighing union interests,
the Court acknowledged that the union has an interest in bargaining
over the decision to close, since closing decisions tend to result in job
termination. 6 The Court maintained, however, that a union's interest in
helping union members keep jobs would compel the union to use the
bargaining opportunity to stall or delay a closing even when management had no alternative to the closing.' The Court further determined
that alternatives to mandatory bargaining adequately protect labor interests. 8 Since the NLRA requires employers to bargain over the effects
on employees of a closing decision, 9 the FNM Court stated that unimons
would have a sufficient opportunity to attempt to bargain over the closing decision when exercising the right to bargain over the effects of the
closing. 0 Alternatively, the Court suggested that a union could protect
its interests further by securing contractual rights to bargain over closing decisions. 1 In addition, the Court observed that section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA protects unions against a partial closing motivated by anti-union
sentiment by allowing the Board to investigate employer reasons for partial closings.2 The FNM Court thus found that the NLRA adequately
" 101 S. Ct. at 2581. The FNM Court's balancing test by its language applies not only
to partial closing decisions, but to decisions having a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment. I&L The Court based the balancing test on the Court's language
in Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S 203 (1964). See text accompanying notes
77-84 infra.
101 S. Ct. at 2581-83; see text accompanying note 41 supra.
' 101 S. Ct. at 2581-82. The FNM Court cited Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964), in stating that termination of employment falls within the literal
meaning of § 8(d) of the NLRA. 101 S.Ct. at 2581; see text accompanying notes 77-84 infra.
'7

101 S. Ct. at 2582-83.

,' Id.; see text accompanying notes 49-52 infra.
, 101 S. Ct. 2580 n.15. The issue of an employer's duty to bargain over a management
decision is distinct from the issue of an employer's duty to bargain over the effects on
employees of the employer's decision, which is mandatory. Id. at 2582; Royal Typewriter Co.
v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1976); Morrison Cafet. Consol., Inc. v. NLRB, 431
F.2d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Transmarine Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Rapid
Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961). Effects of termination typically include, inter
alia, severance pay, vacation pay and pensions. 380 F.2d at 939.
1 101 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court in FNM maintained that the union would attempt to offer concessions, information, and alternatives to management in order to delay or prevent
the closing, regardless of whether bargaining over the decision would be unlikely to augment the flow of information and suggestions. Id.
51 Id. The FNM Union, however, never had an opportunity to negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 2576.
Id at 2582. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA provides:
(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer-
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protects union interests without mandating bargaiiing over economically motivated partial closing decisions under section 8(a)(5).1 In contrast
to union interests, the FNM Court maintained that management selfinterest would serve to compel an employer to bargain over a partial
closing decision if possible union concessions would make staying open a
profitable alternative. 4 In addition, the Court reasoned that business
necessity or lack of a feasible alternative to closing may make imposition
of a bargaining requirement unreasonable.5 5
The FNM Court noted a significant difference between permitting
bargaining and mandating bargaining. 8 The Court reasoned that characterizing a partial closing decision as a mandatory bargaining subject
would tip the balance of negotiating strength in favor of the union by
giving the union a powerful and potentially harmful tool that would
frustrate the equalizing purposes of the NLRA.5 7 Further, the relative
paucity of labor contract provisions allowing union participation in the
partial closing decision-making process indicated to the FNM Court that
a partial closing decision might not be a suitable topic for mandatory
bargaining."
Finally, the FNM Court rejected the Second Circuit's presumption
approach as difficult to apply and unsuited to attaining the objectives of
the NLRA 9 The Court stated that harsh Board-imposed remedies for
failure to bargain might compel employers to bargain over every closing
decision, simply because management could not be certain in advance
whether the circumstances surrounding the decision could overcome the
(3)by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization ...

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976); see Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263,
275 (1965) (partial closing motivated by anti-union animus violates § 8(a)(3)).
101 S. Ct. at 2582.
Id. The FNM Court noted instances of labor concessions aiding failing businesses,
but pointed out that the concessions were not the result of a statutory bargaining requirement. Id. at 2582 n.19.
5 Id. at 2583. The Court in FNM maintained that management may have a business
need for speed, flexibility and secrecy. Id. The Court suggested that timing and publicity of
the closing may have varied and drastic consequences for the business. Id.
5 Id.
1, Id. The FNM Court was concerned that the union might use the right to bargain
over the closing to stall or delay the closing without regard to the cost to management and
without a good faith desire to present a feasible solution. Id.; see text accompanying note 47
supra.
"' 101 S. Ct. at 2583. The FNM Court considered the prevalence of contract clauses
providing for bargaining over partial closing decisions as indicative of bargaining suitability
in reliance on the language in Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211
(1964). See 101 S. Ct. at 2581; text accompanying notes 77-84 infra.
11101 S. Ct. at 2583. The FNM Court stated that without explanation that the Second
Circuit's presumption analysis did not seem suited to promoting harmonious relations between management and labor. Id.; see text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
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mandatory bargaining presumption.0 In addition, the Court maintained
that if an employer did decide to bargain, neither the employer nor the
union could be certain at what stage in the decision-making process to
bargain,"1 or to what extent the parties should bargain.2
The FNM Court held that under the facts in FNM, economically
motivated partial closing decisions are not section 8(d) terms or conditions of employment over which Congress has mandated bargaining." 3
First, the Supreme Court noted that FNM had not closed the Greenpark
operation merely to replace union employees with non-union employees. 4
The Court thus maintained that economic considerations, and not antiunion sentiment, had motivated the employer's partial closing decision. 5
Second, the FNM Court stated that the cost of union labor did not cause
FNM's financial difficulties with Greenpark.6 According to the Court,
the employer's problems with the profitability of the Greenpark operation centered on the amount of the weekly management fee, over which
the Union had no control. 7 Third, the Court observed that FNM had
' 101 S. Ct. at 2583. The Court in FNM suggested that the Board might force the
employer who refused to bargain to pay large sums in backpay to employees whom the
employer might have discharged in any event, or that the Board might force the employer
to consider reopening a failing operation. Id. Section 10(c) of the NLRA gives the Board the
power to issue to employers found to have committed an unfair labor practice orders requiring such employers to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1976). In addition, the Board has the power to take affirmative action to effectuate the
policies of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) (§ 10(c) of NLRA). Affirmative action may include reinstatement of employees, with or without backpay. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). A
reviewing court must uphold a Board order unless the order is shown to be an attempt to
achieve ends other than those that will further the objectives of the NLRA. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
101 S. Ct. at 2584. The Board maintains that bargaining over a decision to close
should take place when the employer has begun to seriously consider closing a portion of its
business. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 569, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264, 1269 (1966).
62 101 S. Ct. at 2584.
Id. Expressly limiting the holding to the facts of the case, see id. at 2585, the FNM
Court did not exclude economically motivated partial closing decisions from the coverage of
§ 8(d) terms and conditions of employment, but instead held that such decisions are not
terms and conditions over which an employer must bargain. See id. at 2584.
" Id. at 2585. The FNM Court noted that FNM did not discharge the Greenpark
employees with the intention of replacing the employees or moving the operation
elsewhere. Id. If FNM had replaced the employees with non-union employees or had moved
to a new location to avoid unionized labor, FNM would have committed an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(3) if the replacement or move had a chilling effect on unionization. See note

23 supra.
' 101 S. Ct. at 2585. An anti-union partial closing violates § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965); see note 52 supra.
" 101 S. Ct. at 2585.
6, Id.; see text accompanying notes 10 & 15 supra. The FNM Court indicated that
bargaining over an economically motivated closing decision may be futile when the cost of
labor is not a cause of the economic difficulty. 101 S. Ct. at 2584. The Court maintained that
the Union's lack of control over FNM's financial difficulties distinguished the FNM situation
from that in Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See text accompanying notes 77-84 infra (contracting out work previously performed by in-house union labor,
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been losing money at Greenpark before the Union became the employees'
bargaining agent5 The closing decision, therefore, did not indicate that
FNM closed the operation to avoid negotiations or terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. 9 Finally, the Court stated that the Greenpark
closing was a significant change in FNM's business, comparable to a complete withdrawal from business, which is not a mandatory bargaining

subject."
Dissenting Justices Brennan and Marshall criticized the FNM majority's balancing test for failing to consider union interests in addition
to the interests of management.71 The dissent further attacked the majority's application of the balancing test as purely speculative.72 In particular, the dissent pointed out that the majority cited no support for the
assertions that requiring bargaining over partial closing decisions would
provide minimal benefits and would unduly frustrate the needs of
management.7" The dissent, therefore, concluded that the Supreme
motivated by high cost of union labor, is mandatory subject of bargaining under § 8(5) of
NLRA). The FNM Court reasoned that the FNM Union, unlike the Fibreboardunion, could
not have offered any concessions to management because the cost of union labor was not the
cause of FNM's financial problems. 101 S. Ct. at 2585. Although the Union possibly could
have accepted a lower wage rate or could have agreed to do the Greenpark work in a more
cost-efficient manner, thereby lowering the cost of labor, Greenpark was obligated to pay
FNM the cost of labor plus a supervisory fee. See id. at 2575; text accompanying note 10
supra;NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 602 (2d Cir. 1980). In order for
the savings in labor costs to benefit the employer, therefore, Greenpark would have had to
agree to pass on the savings to FNM by continuing to pay the same weekly total rather than
reducing the payment by the amount of any labor cost reduction. See 101 S. Ct. at 2575.
101 S. Ct. at 2585; see text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
69 101 S. Ct. at 2585. A closing made solely to avoid ongoing negotiations or terms of a
current collective bargaining agreement violates § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1976).
72 101 S.Ct. at 2585. A partial closing typically is defined as a closing of one plant of a
business that consists of more than one plant. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965). In Darlingtou, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether an employer violated § 8(a)(3) by closing one of its plants in response to unionization of the employees at the plant. Id. at 274. In dicta, the DarlingtonCourt stated that an
employer does not violate the NLRA by going out of business altogether, since the NLRA
only applies to active businesses. Id. at 268-74. The Court's language in FNM thus lends approval to the Darlingtonnotion that bargaining is not required when an employer completely withdraws from business. In addition, the FNM Court found that FNM's cancellation of
the Greenpark contract, although not involving significant investment or withdrawal of
capital, represented a change in FNM's business that compares with going out of business
entirely. 101 S. Ct. at 2585; see text accompanying notes 92-98 infra.
"' 101 S. Ct. at 2586 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The FNM dissent cited the Third
Circuit's balancing test in Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB as an example of a balancing
test that takes into account the interests in bargaining of both labor and management. Id.;
see 582 F.2d at 734-40 (employers must bargain over economically motivated partial closing
decision if union interests outweigh management interests); note 33 supra.
101 S.Ct. at 2586. (Brennan,.J., dissenting).
" Id. The FNM dissent further stated that the Board should determine whether a partial closing decision is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. The dissent pointed out the
majority's acknowledgement that Congress deliberately left open the meaning of terms and
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Court should have upheld the Court of Appeals' presumption approach
while vacating the judgment and remanding to the Board for further examination of the evidence.74
In determining whether a particular employer decision is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the Board and the courts typically have
held that a management decision having a significant impact upon the
employment relationship affects terms or conditions of employment
under NLRA section 8(d).75 Nonetheless, courts often have hesitated to
impose a bargaining requirement over decisions that appear to be unsuitable for the collective bargaining process, even though the decisions
affect terms or conditions of employment.7" In finding no duty to bargain
over management decisions that have a significant impact upon the
employment relationship, courts rely upon the Supreme Court's decision
in FibreboardPaperPro& Corp. v. NLRB.7 7
conditions of employment, reserving for the Board the authority to interpret the phrase in
light of changing industrial conditions. Id.; see id. at 2579 n.14. Since existing Board decisions support the Second Circuit's presumption approach, the dissent would have upheld
the Second Circuit's reasoning. Id. at 2587; See text accompanying note 74 infra. The FNM
dissent cited Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966), as a case in which the Board has
determined that an employer's decision to close a portion of its operations is a mandatory
subject of bargaining under the NLRA because the decision affects terms and conditions of
employment. 101 S. Ct. at 2586; see Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540
(1943) (reviewing court may not reverse Board order unless order shown not to further purposes of NLRA); note 60 supra. But see Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495 (1979)
(judgment of Board regarding whether topic is subject of mandatory bargaining is judicially
reviewable, but courts should defer to Board if Board's construction of NLRA reasonably
defensible).
' 101 S. Ct. at 2587 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7 See NLRB v. Ladish Co., 538 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th Cir. 1976) (to constitute mandatory
subject, matter must affect signficantly terms or conditions of employment); Seattle First
Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 30, 32-33 (9th Cir. 1971) (incidental, remote, or indirect impact
on employment relationship not sufficient to make subject mandatory); American Smelting
& Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969) (subject
must materially affect conditions of employment to be mandatory subject of bargaining);
NLRB v. Lehigh Port. Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821, 823 (4th Cir. 1953) (same).
" See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1978) (establishment of
vending-machine prices not managerial decision lying at core of entrepreneurial control);
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213 (1964) (requiring employer to
bargain over decision to contract out work previously done by in-house employees would
not abridge employer's freedom to manage business); 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (management decisions fundamental to basic direction of business should be excluded
from § 8(d) coverage); Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980) (decision to change
restaurant from full service to cafeteria-style not within managerial prerogative); NLRB v.
Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965) (requiring bargaining over basic change
in operations would abridge significantly management freedom to run business); NLRB v.
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965) (no duty to bargain because
decision to close one plant involved major change in direction of business, thus at core of
managerial control); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961) (decision
to move business clearly within realm of managerial discretion and therefore not mandatory
subject of collective bargaining).
17379 U.S. 203 (1964); see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1978)
(establishment of vending-machine prices managerial decision lying at core of entrepre-
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In Fibreboard,the Supreme Court held that an *employer'sdecision
to discharge its maintenance employees and contract out the work that
the discharged employees previously had performed is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under section 8(d) of the NLRA.78 The
FibreboardCourt acknowledged that the impact of the decision to contract out is termination of the employment relationship. 9 The Court thus
stated that the decision to contract out fell clearly within the language of
section 8(d).8" Before finding that the employer had a duty to bargain,
however, the FibreboardCourt observed that the employer's decision to
contract out was a topic peculiarly suitable for collective bargaining."
The Court, therefore, concluded that a bargaining requirement would
further the NLRA'sopurpose of promoting industrial peace through the
collective bargaining process!' In particular, the Fibreboard Court
determined that to require the employer to bargain over the decision to
contract out would not significantly abridge the-employer's freedom to
manage the business," since the decision did not alter the employer's
basic operation or capital structure.'
The FNM Court acknowledged that the FNM employer's decision to
terminate the Greenpark contract had a direct impact upon the employment relationship.85 Nonetheless, the Court found that the focus of the
employer's decision was purely economic and, therefore, possibly within
the sole discretion of management. 8 The FNM Court's application of a
managerial prerogative exception to the duty to bargain is an expansion
neurial control); Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980) (decision to change
restaurant from full service to cafeteria-style not within managerial prerogative); NLRB v.
Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965) (requiring bargaining over basic change
in operations would abridge sigfiificantly management's freedom to run business); NLRB v.
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965) (no duty to bargain because
decision to close one plant involved major change in direction of business, thus at the core of
entrepreneurial control).
7' 379 U.S. at 215.
Id. at 210.

Id.; see note 5 supra.
Id. at 213-14. The FibreboardCourt discussed the feasibility of discussions between
management and labor when labor cost concessions could present an acceptable alternative
to discharging the employees in favor of subcontract labor. Id. at 214. The Court pointed out
the success that collective bargaining has had in resolving economic conflicts between labor
and management. Id. at 214. The Court maintained that inclusion of contracting-out decisions within the coverage of § 8(d) would further the purposes of the NLRA, by ensuring
labor-management communication about matters of vital concern to both parties. Id. at 214;
see text accompanying notes 1-3 supra. The industrial practice. of incorporating into labor
contracts provisions that require bargaining over decisions to contract out further convinced the FibreboardCourt that such decisions are appropriate subjects of bargaining. 379
U.S. at 214.
379 U.S. at 214.
Id. at 213. The FibreboardCourt noted that the decision to contract out did not involve a significant capital investment. Id.
"Id.
101 S. Ct. at 2579.
Id. at 2579-80; see note 42 supra.
S,
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of the Supreme Court's language in Fibreboard.7 Many courts have
relied on Fibreboardin finding no duty to bargain over decisions that
are fundamental to the employer's need for entrepreneurial freedom to
manage the business." The FNM Court, by establishing a balancing test
to determine whether a decision should be completely within management's prerogative, solidified a court-made exception to the section
8(a)(5) duty to bargain over matters affecting terms or conditions of
employment.
A literal reading of the NLRA reveals no exception to the duty to
bargain over matters affecting terms or conditions of employment. 9 In
light of the NLRA's aim of promoting harmonious relations between
labor and management, however, the FNM Court's reluctance to adhere
strictly to the bargaining requirement may be defensible. If a bargaining
requirement would impose unfair hardship on an employer because discussion between labor and management could not possibly alter the
employer's basis for a decision, the discord that could result from required bargaining would not contribute to industrial peace. The Second
Circuit's holding in FNM, therefore, seems sound in emphasizing that
bargaining would further the aims of the NLRA if discussion between
labor and managenient could modify or reverse the employer's decision. 0
The FNM Court's analysis, however, while applying the Fibreboard consideration of whether a bargaining requirement will further the purposes of the NLRA, 1 places greater emphasis upon managerial prerogative than upon other considerations of appropriateness of bargaining,
such as equalization of bargaining power. The FNM analysis, therefore,
gives more weight to the concerns of management than to the impact on
labor relations of a bargaining requirement.
Further, the FNM Court found FNM's interest in freedom to terminate the Greenpark contract sufficient to excuse FNM from bargaining, despite the lack of any major changes in capital structure or in the
scope of the enterprise. 2 Courts generally have held that a change in
" See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra.
" See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1978) (establishment of
vending-machine prices not managerial decision lying at core of entrepreneurial control);
Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980) (decision to change restaurant from full
service to cafeteria-style not within managerial prerogative); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc.,
350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965) (requiring bargaining over basic change in operations would
abridge significantly management freedom to run business); NLRB v. Royal Plating &
Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965) (no duty to bargain because decision to close
one plant involved major change in direction of business, thus at core of managerial control).
89 See notes 4 & 5 supra.
0 See 627 F.2d 596, 602; text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
101 S. Ct. at 2580.
Id. at 2585. The Court in FNM found that FNM's business did not involve large
amounts of capital in single locations. Id. Thus, the Greenpark closing did not require a
great divestment of capital. In addition, the Court noted that the administrative law judge
found FNM's usual method of operation to involve the continual taking on and discontin-
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business operations that did not involve major capital expenditures but
did result in termination of jobs constituted a mandatory bargaining subject.93 The FNM decision, therefore,, may have a profound impact on
future cases involving an employer's duty to bargain over certain
business decisions. FNM's decision to discontinue operations under the
Greenpark contract is roughly analogous to various other managerial
decisions that result in termination of employment. 9' Although the FNM
Court expressly reserved for future consideration questions regarding
the duty to bargain over analogous kinds of employer decisions, 9 application of the FNM Court's analysis appears to exempt these decisions
from the duty to bargain, provided no anti-union animus exists.99
An'alteration in a business' method of operation is one example of a
management decision that potentially intrudes upon employment security and thus arguably constitutes a mandatory bargaining subject. In
determining whether decisions regarding operational 'alterations fall
within management's prerogative and do not constitute mandatory bargaining subjects, the courts and the Board prior to FNM have placed
great emphasis on the level of capital investment or divestment involved
in a particular conversion? Under the FNM analysis, however, the level
of change in capital structure resulting from a managerial decision is no
uance of the various maintenance jobs, so that the termination of the Greenpark contract
neither altered the nature of FNM's business nor substantially affected the size of FNM's
business. Id. at 2576 n.5; see 242 N.L.R.B. at 466.
'" See, e.g. Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d at 1269 (citing Fibreboard).In Davis, the Seventh
Circuit upheld a Board decision that an employer had a duty to bargain over the decision to
transform a full-service restaurant into a self-service cafeteria. Id. at 1269-70. In upholding
the Board's finding, the Davis court stated that Davis did not make a substantial capital investment in order to change the restaurant into the cafeteria. Id. at 1270-71. The Davis
court went on, however, to reverse the Board's enforcement order on other grounds. Id. at
1278. See also General Motors Corp., GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N.L.R.B. 951,952 (1971)
(decisions in which significant investment or withdrawal of capital will affect scope or direction of enterprise are at core of entrepreneurial control); note 97 infra.
In contrast to Davis, the Board in NLRB v. Vegas Vic. Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 841 (1974),
affd, 546 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977), held that an alteration in
a cocktail lounge's method of operations was not a mandatory subject because the conversions in question required a large capital outlay. 213 N.L.R.B. at 846.
Management decisions analogous to the decision in FNM include partially closing or
relocating firm facilities, selling segments of a business, and altering the business' method
of operation. See note 97 infra.
" 101 S.Ct. at 2575 n.22.
See text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
The Board and the courts rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard.See,
e.g., NLRB v. Int'l Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85, 88 (9th Cir. 1980) (reorganization of
marketing structure involving significant changes in capital structure not mandatory
bargaining subject); Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980) (change from fullservice to cafeteria-style restaurant did not involve sufficient capital expenditure to bring
conversion decision within managerial prerogative); NLRB v. Vegas Vic, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B.
841, 846, 87 L.R.R.M. 1269, 1270-71 (1974), aff'd,,546 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 818 (1977) (conversion of bar involving considerable capital expenditure not mandatory
bargaining subject).
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longer crucial in determining whether a management decision is a required bargaining subject.9" The existence of any capital change or
alteration in scope or direction of the business, no matter how slight, appears to be sufficient to invoke application of the managerial prerogative
exception, if no anti-union animus exists. In cases involving management
decisions that change methods of a business' operation and adversely affect employment, therefore, courts no longer may rely upon the absence
of large capital changes to find that management decisions are mandatory subjects.
The FNM Court, by couching the managerial prerogative exception
as applicable to economically motivated decisions,99 implicitly excluded
anti-union decisions from the managerial prerogative exception."0 In
thus implying that decisions resulting from anti-union considerations are
mandatory bargaining subjects, the Court injected a motive element into
section 8(a)(5) determinations. In determining whether an employer's
failure to bargain literally violates section 8(a)(5), the sole issue should be
whether the employer refused to bargain over a matter included in section 8(d) terms or conditions of employment.'' Neither section 8(a)(5) nor
section 8(d) contains language excepting economically motivated decisions from the duty to bargain over matters affecting terms or conditions of employment.1"2 A literal reading of the NLRA indicates that an
employer's economic or anti-union motivation is irrelevant under section
8(a)(5)."'0 The employer's reason for deciding to close part of its operations, however, may be important insofar as a court may be reluctant to
require bargaining when discussion between management and labor
would be futile.014 Nevertheless, the employer's economic motivation for
a decision should not become the basis of an exception to the duty to
bargain unless union input presents no possibility of altering the
economic consideration." 5
A union attempting to avoid application of the FNM exception to the
bargaining duty might argue that the employer made a job-terminating
decision in part because of anti-union sentiment.' Under the FNM
See 101 S. Ct. at 2585; text accompanying note 92 supra.
See 101 S. Ct. at 2581.
11 See id. The FNM Court recognized that a § 8(a)(3) violation might result from an
anti-union closing. See id. at 2582; text accompanying note 52 supra. One possible interpretation of the Court's application of the balancing test is that a finding of a § 8(a)(3) violation necessitates a finding of a duty to bargain.
I01Ozark Trailers, Inc. 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 566, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264, 1268 (1966); see 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) & 158(d) (1976) (§§ 8(a)(5) & 8(d) of NLRA); Heinsz, The Partial Closing
Conundrum.. The Duty of Employers and Unions to BargainIn Good Faith,1981 DUKE L.J.
71; notes 4 & 5 supra.
"' See notes 4 & 5 supra.
103 Id.
10, See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
"o See text accompanying note 90 supra.
100See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
"
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holding, a mixed motivation argument might be particularly convincing.
if the union can show that labor cost considerations are the heart of the
employer's economic difficulties. 7 An alternative available to unions attempting to secure in advance a duty to bargain rather than relying
upon after-the-fact motive arguments is to incorporate a duty to bargain
over the decision into the union contract.' As in the FNM case,
however, a union may. not have time to negotiate a bargaining agreement." 9 A union whose members have been discharged immediately
following certification and prior to negotiation of a collective bargaining
agreement could argue that the timing of the discharge evidences antiunion motivation for the management decision that resulted in the
discharge. 10 A union thus may be able to avoid application. of FNM's
managerial prerogative exception to the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain
by showing that anti-union sentiment to some extent motivated management's decision.
The FNM balancing test for determining whether a, decision is a
mandatory bargaining subject is impractical.' An employer will have
difficulty determining in advance of implementing a decision whether
the burden of bargaining is sufficient to dissipate the duty to bargain,
since the determination of whether the duty to bargain exists depends
on the facts of each case."' In addition, the FNM Court's criticism of the
Second Circuit's presumption approach, that harsh remedies for failure
to bargain may compel employers to bargain even when discussion
would be futile,"3 may apply equally to FNMs test.
The Supreme Court's decision in FNM indicates that employers
possess increased freedom to make business decisions that impact
directly upon the employment relationship, and thus resolves a difficult
issue in favor of employers. The Court's managerial prerogative exception as applied in FNM weakens the effectiveness of Congress' section
8(a)(5) attempt to ensure bargaining equality between management and
labor." ' After FNM, employers may be more likely to make business
"7 If labor costs are the main financial concern of the employer, a union might argue
convincingly that the problem centers on labor. See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB,
379 U.S. 203, 213-14 (1964). If union problems are the cause of the employer's decision to

close or change operations and eliminate jobs, the union could argue that the managerial

prerogative exception does not apply. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
," See 101 S. Ct. at 2582. A clause in a collective bargaining agreement requiring
bargaining over decisions that potentially eliminate jobs has the same effect as a statutory
bargaining mandate under § 8(a)(5).
'7' See 101 S. Ct. at 2576; text accompanying note 19 supra.
" Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits an employer from discharging employees from
union membership. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a){3) (1976); see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 183 (1940).
"
See text accompanying notes 112-14 infra.
' See 101 S. Ct. at 2585; text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
" See 101 S. Ct. at 2583; text accompanymg note 60 supra.
"
See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
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changes without bargaining in the hope that the union will be unable to
prove anti-union motivation or that the passage of time will cause courts
finding a section 8(a)(5) violation to hesitate to grant harsh remedies. 115
Unions, on the other hand, are left without effective economic weapons
with which to force employers to recognize employee interests, since
strikes by non-employees cannot harm the employer.
The FNM Court's adoption of a motivation-based exception to the
8(a)(5) duty to bargain excuses employers from bargaining over decisions
resulting in termination of employment, which have a severe impact on
the employment relationship. A decision that affects terms or conditions
of employment is a mandatory bargaining subject under the NLRA,"'
which contains no express exception for economically motivated decisions 11 7 or for decisions at the core of managerial prerogative. 18 Courts
choosing to require bargaining only when the duty will promote the objectives of the NLRA should find exceptions to the bargaining requirement only when bargaining would be futile and would result in harm to
the employer or to labor-management relations."' The FNM decision, by
allowing employers more leeway in making business decisions,120 greatly
reduces the bargaining power of unions.121 The FNM decision thus
thwarts Congress' purpose of balancing bargaining power, and complicates application of the employer's section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain over
terms and conditions of employment.
JULIAD. HARLIN
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